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The world-wide spread of the novel coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19) has provided ample opportunities for state ac-
tors, in particular from the major powers China and Russia, 
to spread disinformation about its origins, proliferation and 
the effectiveness of other actors’ varying responses to the 
threat. This is consistent with previously observed efforts of 
these countries to use manipulation to distort political envi-
ronments in democracies (Walker 2018). 
According to reports from the European External Action Ser-
vice (EEAS) and the State Department’s Global Engagement 
Center (GEC), both the European Union (EU) and the United 
States (US) have found themselves in the middle of Russian 
and Chinese disinformation campaigns, which also provided 
attractive content for conspiracy theorists and far-right ex-
tremists across the West. This is happening despite a num-
ber of legislative, investigative and other actions taken by 
the EU and the US in recent years to prevent third states 
from interfering in their internal affairs.  
This policy brief discusses how the EU and US have responded 
to Russian and Chinese disinformation during the COVID-19 
pandemic, arguing that it should be viewed as an opportunity 
to improve EU and US policies by adopting new or revising 
legislation and improving transatlantic cooperation based on 
mutual understanding, shared best practices and compro-
mise. The argument is developed by, first, charting the Rus-
sian and Chinese disinformation campaigns during the 
COVID-19 crisis. Against this backdrop, EU and US responses 
are analysed. Finally, the policy brief develops recommenda-
tions for improving anti-disinformation policies. 
Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns 
During the pandemic Russia and China have routinely re-
sorted to spreading aggressive disinformation campaigns 
against the European Union and the United States.  
Russia 
Already in January 2020, the pro-Kremlin media, such as Rus-
sia Today and Sputnik, and a wider coordinated network of 
online bots and trolls, started to spread conspiracy theories 
linking the coronavirus to American weapons of mass de-
struction that originated in a US military lab (EEAS 2020a). In 
March, when the number of new infections began to escalate 
in Europe, the same media re-adopted their tried and tested 
techniques, previously deployed during the Brexit and Cata-
lan referendums, of trying to undermine the confidence of 
Executive Summary 
> Since at least the month of January 2020, both 
Russia and China have been trying to influence 
global narratives about the COVID-19 pandemic in 
efforts to undermine the credibility and reputa-
tion of both the EU and the US in the eyes of their 
citizens as well as partners around the world.  
> They do so by creating and spreading disinfor-
mation campaigns on the internet as well as 
through state-backed traditional media. 
> The EU and the United States have to react not 
only to prevent negative consequences in terms of 
public health impacts, but also to preserve their 
regional and global credibility. 
> In the EU, the anti-disinformation policy put in 
place has been usefully implemented since the 
start of the pandemic but should be further 
strengthened taking into account lessons learned 
over the past few months. 
> In the US, a limited response to COVID-19 disinfor-
mation has shown clear gaps in what is yet to be-
come a counterstrategy. Developing a solid legis-
lative foundation and raising awareness should be 
the priorities in this respect, especially in the run-
up to the presidential elections. 
> A joint global approach to disinformation can only 
be based on successful practices from both sides 
of the Atlantic, understanding of each other’s dif-
ferences and compromise.  
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European citizens in their institutions and sow distrust. The 
pro-Kremlin outlets promoted narratives about the EU’s col-
lapse, caused by the inability to deal with the pandemic, be-
trayal of the EU’s fundamental values, and maintained that 
Russia’s and China’s handling of the crisis was superior (EEAS 
2020c). For example, Sputnik Italy claimed that “the EU 
stands idly by while COVID-19 causes mass slaughter and an 
economic tsunami which is about to overwhelm Europe”, and 
the Russian state channel, Rossia 24, informed its viewers 
that the “Western human-centric system of values has col-
lapsed” (EEAS 2020b). 
Disinformation about the cures and treatment of COVID-19 
and claims that the virus is a hoax and its dangerousness ex-
aggerated may have been especially harmful, as they contrib-
uted to promoting forms of behaviour that put individual and 
public health in Western societies under a direct threat. Con-
spiracy theories around ineffectiveness and harm of vaccines, 
as well as false statements that mass vaccination and nano-
chip implantation will be used by the governments for social 
control are widespread (EEAS 2020d.) This and other health-
related disinformation has been disseminated in many lan-
guages, including German, English and Arabic, via local 
branches of Sputnik, RT and South Front (ibid.). Some of the 
false claims have been picked up by far-right extremists and 
populists on both sides of the Atlantic and shared on 4chan, 
Reddit, Facebook and Telegram (Scott/Overly 2020).  
Following China’s example, in March, Russia also sent medical 
supplies and teams to Italy in a mission called “From Russia 
with Love”. Interestingly, both the populist Italian 5Star 
Movement and the far-right party Alternative for Germany 
have tried to take credit for enabling Russian aid. This ‘hu-
manitarian’ mission was later used for propaganda and disin-
formation campaigns against the EU (EEAS 2020c).  
China 
Whereas Russia is generally considered to have been the first 
country to launch disinformation campaigns in the West ever 
since the occupation of Crimea in 2014, China is believed to 
have started directly targeting Western audiences only dur-
ing the Hong Kong protests in 2019 (Conge 2019). Since then, 
however, Beijing has continued using similar techniques in its 
dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, which seems to indi-
cate that it is increasingly serious about trying to influence 
the global information environment beyond its borders and 
is ready to follow in Russia’s footsteps. This view has been 
backed, for example, by a recent analysis of the Twitter eco-
system which found that accounts linked to the Chinese state 
were used to support anti-US and anti-Western content on 
Russian sites (Brandt/Schafer 2020).  
However, China is not only learning from Russia but also de-
veloping its own techniques and narratives. China appears to 
be more interested than Russia in promoting a positive image 
of itself (rather than merely tainting that of others) and has 
devoted more resources to it (ibid.). In Europe, it was quick 
to adopt ‘masks diplomacy’ by supplying large quantities of 
personal protective equipment to countries such as Italy, 
Spain, Poland and the Czech Republic. While such actions may 
have helped to lift some pressure on the national health sys-
tems (despite frequent reports of quality issues with the 
equipment), the fact that they were invariably accompanied 
by mass information campaigns on Chinese propaganda sites, 
and included narratives about failures of the Western democ-
racies to adequately respond to the crisis (Pinna 2020), raises 
questions about Beijing’s real motivations.  
The Chinese disinformation against the US, on the other 
hand, is much more aggressive in tone, probably in response 
to the US President’s (and other administration officials’) 
statements since the outbreak of COVID-19. President Trump 
has regularly called its cause a ‘Chinese virus’, and reminded 
the world that the first outbreak occurred in Wuhan, some-
thing that China has been trying to deflect attention from. In 
this context, Beijing did not shy away from using official chan-
nels, such as China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to endorse 
and promote a particular conspiracy theory claiming that the 
virus was imported into the country by US soldiers. At the 
same time, President Trump has himself been a source of dis-
information by contending that the virus was man-made in a 
Chinese lab alongside other unfounded claims related to 
sometimes outright harmful methods of treating COVID-19. 
This undoubtedly helped the Chinese side paint itself as the 
more credible one. The two countries are now engaged in 
what some have called a “titanic information war” (Wong et 
al. 2020). 
The European Union’s response 
The EU’s response to disinformation about the COVID-19 
pandemic has been guided by the 2018 ‘Tackling Online Dis-
information: a European Approach‘ and ’Action Plan Against 
Disinformation’ (European Commission 2018; European Com-
mission/High Representative 2018). Its policy is based on four 
pillars: improving the capabilities of EU institutions to detect, 
analyse and expose disinformation; strengthening coordi-
nated and joint responses; mobilising the private sector; and 
raising awareness and improving societal resilience.  
Concerning the first pillar, the EEAS has so far played the most 
visible role in identifying and analysing disinformation in EU 
member states and neighbouring regions. It has provided reg-
ular Corona updates on the EUvsDisinfo website, through 
newsletters and Special Reports, which have been key in ex-
posing the extent and depth of Russian and Chinese disinfor-
mation campaigns against the EU and its members (EEAS 
2020b). Much of this work is a continuation of the efforts of 
‘The East Strategic Communication Task Force’ created in 
2015 to address Russian disinformation campaigns. Its team 
put together an impressive database of 8,000 disinformation 
cases, analysed narratives and techniques, and established 
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cooperation with fact-checking organisations in the EU and its 
neighbourhood.  
It was because of the COVID-19 pandemic that the EEAS for 
the first time seriously looked into Chinese disinformation, 
however. Its work has been overshadowed by the allegations, 
subsequently strongly denied, that due to China’s pressure, 
the EEAS had watered down some of the critical language on 
China (Apuzzo 2020) in a report on disinformation (EEAS 
2020d). Even if unconfirmed, these developments cast a 
shadow on the important work of this institution, and raise a 
broader question about the difficulty of implementing the 
EU’s foreign policy when, in the case of China, some member 
states with close economic ties to Beijing indeed prefer a 
softer tone vis-à-vis the country.  
The EU’s ’Code of Practice Against Disinformation’ belongs to 
the third pillar of the EU’s policy. It is a voluntary framework 
created to reduce online disinformation that was signed by 
major tech giants, among which Facebook, Google and Twit-
ter. In preparation of the 2019 European Parliament elec-
tions, the signatories managed to achieve some limited pro-
gress by improving the transparency of advertisement, fact-
checking and using AI to remove fake accounts (European 
Commission 2019). Since the outbreak, additional positive 
developments can be observed. Facebook and YouTube, for 
example, labelled or removed many (but not all) posts rated 
as false by independent fact-checkers in a sample analysed by 
the researchers from the University of Oxford (Brennen et al. 
2020). Facebook has also promoted official advice of the 
World Health Organisation, an action that has been sup-
ported by the EU, and provided some access, yet still arbitrary 
and episodic, to researchers to help create better models for 
anticipating the spread of the coronavirus. Twitter broad-
ened its policy to include harmful content that goes against 
authoritative sources of global and local public health infor-
mation, but failed to label and remove most of this content 
from its platform (ibid.). The next report by the European 
Commission on the progress made by the platforms is due 
sometime this year and should look closely at the strengths 
and weaknesses of the big tech’s response to COVID-19.  
The EU has also tried to improve communication vis-à-vis its 
citizens and to strengthen coordination between the member 
states and third partners (pillars 2 and 4). A dedicated web-
site in all EU languages was created, where myths are de-
bunked and online resources and tools are presented (Euro-
pean Commission 2020). The website includes a video ad-
dress by the President of the European Commission, Ursula 
von der Leyen, trying to raise awareness by stressing that 
“disinformation can cost lives” and asking social media com-
panies to share data with fact-checking organisations. Other 
EU institutions, such as the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union, have also created pages to 
help keep people informed. However, the fact that the video 
of the European Commission’s President was viewed only 
5111 times on YouTube (on 22 May) clearly shows that the 
communication efforts of the European institutions are by far 
not enough, particularly in comparison with the thousands of 
fake news websites and outlets peddling harmful advice.  
Instead, the EU’s existing policy of supporting fact-checkers, 
researchers and local media to help expose disinformation 
campaigns seems considerably more promising in generating 
public awareness of the problem.  
The Rapid Alert System (RAS), the second pillar of the EU’s 
policy, was created pre-COVID-19 to help member states flag 
and share fake news and coordinate strategic communication 
efforts and has been deployed during the outbreak (Stolton 
2020). The RAS had been criticised, however, for the lack of 
common standards on what information to share and of a 
clear roadmap for analysing the collected material (Apuzzo 
2019). It is not clear whether and to what extent this criticism 
has been addressed. Still, contrary to earlier concerns by 
some officials that the system would soon become obsolete, 
it has been handy during the pandemic. This time it is used to 
share information not only between the member states but 
also with partners in the G7, which is an example of the EU’s 
efforts to engage on this topic, including with the US. 
The US response 
Unlike the EU, the US does not yet have a comprehensive pol-
icy on disinformation, in part due to its sweeping, constitu-
tionally anchored conception of free speech. It is falling be-
hind its transatlantic partner not only in terms of conceptual 
framing but also lacks the impetus on the highest level of gov-
ernment to address the challenge (Polyakova/Fried 2019). 
The only exception is the 2019 ‘National Defence Authoriza-
tion Act’, a piece of legislation that recognised, among others, 
the importance of countering disinformation. 
At the same time, different US governmental agencies have, 
in recent years, acquired significant technical expertise and 
understanding of disinformation campaigns during and fol-
lowing the investigation into Russian interference with the 
2016 US Presidential elections. The Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) is one of these agencies. It is in charge of inves-
tigating foreign influence operations, defined as “covert ac-
tions by foreign governments to influence U.S. political senti-
ment or public discourse”, and since 2017 has a dedicated 
Foreign Interference Task Force. There is not a lot of open-
access information on the work of this Task Force and since 
the start of the pandemic, it did not issue any statements. 
However, in cooperation with the Cybersecurity and Infra-
structure Security Agency, the FBI made a public announce-
ment warning US organisations conducting COVID-19-related 
research to be aware of China-affiliated cyber actors who are 
trying to collect intellectual property and public health data 
related to vaccines, treatments, and testing, and advised 
these organisations to take steps to improve their cyber se-
curity (FBI/CISA 2020).  
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Another actor that is closely involved in countering state-
sponsored disinformation is the Global Engagement Center 
(GEC) inside the State Department. Operational since 2017, 
the Center has a budget of $120 million and three teams are 
focusing on Russian, Chinese and Iranian disinformation. GEC 
has raised alarm about disinformation operations during the 
pandemic in its briefings to the State Department leadership, 
partners of the US as well as to the wider public through fact-
checkers in Agence France Presse and coordination with dif-
ferent technology platforms (Gabrielle 2020). However, as 
the recent refusal by Twitter to remove almost 250,000 ac-
counts – identified by GEC to be part of an automated, China-
run bot network –  suggests, the Center’s work still relies 
heavily on the goodwill of the tech giants. 
Cooperation of major tech companies with the government 
and their important role in reducing the public’s exposure to 
disinformation online is part of a larger discussion on regula-
tion. Currently, there is no agreement in the US on what kind 
of legislation, if any, needs to be adopted with regard to 
transparency of advertisement, data privacy, and criteria for 
identifying, labelling or removing false and misleading con-
tent, etc. Some companies have, as seen, started to take ac-
tion even without such legislation in the US, either in antici-
pation of future legislation or to comply with the existing EU 
legislation. However, not all are making sufficient progress. 
To help address this, Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff, 
the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, sent let-
ters to Twitter, Alphabet and YouTube asking them to be 
more proactive and inform users who engage with harmful 
coronavirus-related misinformation and to direct them to au-
thoritative and medically accurate resources (Schiff 2020). 
Nonetheless, such initiatives of Congress(wo)men cannot re-
place a comprehensive legislation.  
Another element of the US response to COVID-19 disinfor-
mation has been an attempt to cooperate with its partners in 
the framework of the G7, currently under the presidency of 
the US. This, however, did not produce positive results be-
cause of a questionable strategy adopted by the US leader-
ship. During the G7 meeting in March, where disinformation 
by China was a prominent topic,  Secretary of State Pompeo 
tried to convince his European counterparts to refer to 
COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus” in their joint statement, a 
wording that was viewed as too confrontational by some of 
the partners. Therefore, unlike the finance ministers and cen-
tral bankers of G7 member states, foreign affairs ministers 
did not manage to issue a joint communiqué after their meet-
ing.  
Conclusion: policy recommendations for the EU and the US 
The COVID-19 pandemic has tested responses of the EU and 
the US in the fight against disinformation, exposing both 
strengths and weakness of domestic approaches and a lack of 
cooperation between the partners in this area.  
The homework that the EU has done in recent years on put-
ting together an anti-disinformation policy has proven useful 
during the pandemic. It should be further reinforced taking 
into account the COVID-19 experience. The European Com-
mission’s most recent communication on countering disinfor-
mation amid COVID-19 contains some welcome further steps, 
including improving support of fact-checkers and research-
ers, giving clear expectations about transparency to online 
platforms, strengthening strategic communication and coop-
eration with partners such as NATO (Jourová 2020). Three ad-
ditional recommendations can be proposed: 
 The EEAS should improve internal management processes 
to exclude any potential third-state interference in their 
important work.  
 If, after a thorough review of digital platforms’ perfor-
mance during the pandemic, the EU finds insufficient re-
sponse by a majority of them, it should drop the voluntary 
character of the ‘Code of Practice’ and move to a binding 
regulation.  
 A new element of EU policy could be the imposition of 
high costs, e.g. via individual or other sanctions against 
media outlets that produce or promote disinformation. 
When it comes to the US, the response to COVID-19 disinfor-
mation has revealed clear gaps in what is yet to become a 
true US strategy. The upcoming presidential elections only 
adds urgency to the cause of consolidating this strategy. How-
ever, since President Trump is unlikely to lead on this matter, 
having himself been a source of disinformation in the past, 
the Congress is better suited for the task. 
 For a start, Congress should mobilise bipartisan support 
to adopt already existing bills, such as the ‘Honest Ads 
Act’, which would make political advertisement more 
transparent, as well as the ‘Defending American Security 
from Kremlin Aggression Act’, which introduces individual 
sanctions for disinformation activities.  
 Furthermore, the American public needs to be better in-
formed and aware of disinformation campaigns. Civil so-
ciety, media and fact-checkers all have an important role 
to play in this, and supporting them should be at the heart 
of any future policy.  
Finally, a better coordination of responses between the EU 
and the US as well as its partners in forums like the G7 is vital 
for the development of a joint global approach, which should 
be based on successful practices from across the Atlantic. 
However, for now, this cooperation is strained in large part 
due to unwillingness of the current US leadership to compro-
mise and adopt a more forward-looking strategy as well as 
President’s Trump personal harmful rhetoric. Nonetheless, 
the EU and its member states should continue to try and en-
gage with the US government on this topic, bilaterally as well 
as multilaterally, as this is potentially an area of a significant 
shared interest, a scarce commodity today.  
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